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Abstract
We study minority games in efficient regime. By incorporating the utility
function and aggregating agents with similar strategies we develop an effec-
tive mesoscale notion of state of the game. Using this approach, the game
can be represented as a Markov process with substantially reduced number of
states with explicitly computable probabilities. For any payoff, the finiteness
of the number of states is proved. Interesting features of an extensive ran-
dom variable, called aggregated demand, viz. its strong inhomogeneity and
presence of patterns in time, can be easily interpreted. Using Markov the-
ory and quenched disorder approach, we can explain important macroscopic
characteristics of the game: behavior of variance per capita and predictabil-
ity of the aggregated demand. We prove that in case of linear payoff many
attractors in the state space are possible.
Keywords: Minority game, adaptive system, Markov process, mesoscopic
scale
1. Introduction
Evolution of complex systems capable to adapt to varying environments
by using shared memory is often considered as one of the fundamental dynam-
ical problems in sciences. But large numbers of parameters a priori needed
to describe them render difficult their exact analytic treatments. More effi-
cient approaches are based on computational methods and direct modelling
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of adaptive systems with populations of agents. In course of development of
these models it has been soon realized that even simplified approach with
no communication between individuals, where the only dependence between
them is given by common memory resource, appears to be useful and in-
teresting. Among variety of multi-agent models, the minority game (MG)
provides with a particularly intuitive representation of self-adaption where
individuals reason out inductively and their rationality is limited. The MG
was originally designed in Ref. [1] to account for profitability of playing in
opposite to the plurality of decision makers. The model has been subse-
quently formalized in Refs. [2, 3] and became a well-established area of the
game-theoretical, dynamical and statistical research [4].
The MG is a typical bottom-up construct and therefore usual definitions
of the game first specify rules of behaviour for individuals. Then, piecing
together microscopic variables, one defines higher-order quantities charac-
terizing grander systems. In some cases, however, other descriptions are
also possible, e.g. functions of state like score functions can be attributed
to groups of agents without specifying agents individually [5]. And again,
despite an apparent simplicity of basic rules of taking decisions by agents,
adaptive abilities and phenomenology of populations playing MGs appear to
be surprisingly non-trivial [4, 6]. As shown in Refs. [2, 7], phenomenology
of MG depends qualitatively on game parameters. For example, the macro-
scopic quantity called aggregate attendance, or aggregate demand, pooling
together individual choices, identifies three regimes of the MG: the random,
cooperation and herd. After the authors of Refs. [7, 8], the latter case is also
called efficient, because the total number of strategies is small, compared to
the number of agents, and players have access to all available information. In
addition, in this exceptional case the relatively small number of parameters
enables analytical solutions.
The very first attempt of solving MG analytically was based on the
method of statistical mechanics called the replica analysis. In order to find
a more detailed analogy between statistical physics and MG, the group of
Challet and Zhang [9, 10] limits their analysis to only two strategies per agent
where the manifestation of cooperative effects is the strongest. The agents’
choice is then treated analogously to the projection of the particle’s spin on a
quantization axis in space. The aggregate demand is split into two terms: the
deterministic, forced by the quenched disorder, and a stochastic one that is
further neglected. The quenched disorder term is related to systems in statis-
tical physics when some parameters defining system’s behavior are stationary
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random variables, chosen when the system is created. Even such a simplified
approach led to quite accurate analytical solutions for variance per capita
as a function of the control parameter in the random regime. Additionally,
the authors of Ref. [11] showed that properties of the MG in the symmetric
phase depend on the initial conditions, what was confirmed numerically in
Ref. [12]. If the initial conditions (i.e. the strategies) are drawn randomly,
the system exhibits the so called quenched or frozen disorder. This theory,
however, provides little knowledge on underlying dynamics of the game, i.e.
on the evolution of utilities of strategies, and on existence of time patterns.
An also it does not explain differences of macroscopic observables for different
payoffs.
Another analytical approach, based on generating functional, is offered
by Heimel and Coolen in Ref. [13]. This is the second most used technique,
applicable to the statistical physics and a problem of disordered systems with
random interactions. This method is in principle exact in the limit N →∞,
although generally more difficult to apply than the replica procedure. The
authors redefine the game for two strategies in such a way that instead of
two independent utility values they operate only on one variable q combining
these two for each agent. As a result, the generalized MG is driven by only
three equations, where the vector q = (q1, . . . , qN) represents the state, and
N is the number of players. Then, the game is described in terms of the
microscopic probability densities Pr(q), where the discrete-time dynamics
is replaced by the continuous-time one. Since the state depends on N , the
behavior in the limit N → ∞ can be examined. Similarly to the replica
analysis, the method does not provide any insight into the game dynamics.
Concurrently, the group of Johnson introduced the so called crowd-anti-
crowd theory offering approximate expressions for aggregate demand [14, 15].
Agents act as a crowd if they use the same strategy. If there is a group of
agents using simultaneously the strategy anticorrelated to the first one, they
make the opposite decisions and are considered as an anticrowd. There exist
many different pairs of crowds and anticrowds at the same time. If sizes of
crowd and anticrowd are similar, as it is the case in the cooperation regime,
then the choices of these two groups cancel mutually and the volatility is
kept small. If the crowd dominates, the majority of agents behave in the
same manner and the volatility becomes large. It has been demonstrated
that, considering fluctuations of the aggregated demand, analytical results
are consistent with the numerical ones. Following the crowd-anticrowd rea-
soning, Jefferies et al. in Ref. [5] cast the game into the functional map, which
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reproduces the game when iterated. Such approach has a serious advantage
compared to heuristically introduced rules in Refs. [2, 16], since it does not
need to keep track of the labels for individual agents. In the definition of the
functional map, those agents who hold the same combination of strategies are
grouped together. In MG, individuals with the same strategies respond in
the same way to all values of the global information set µ = {0, 1, . . . , P −1}
(P standing for the number of possible realizations of the winning decision
history µ), provided that the game starts with the same initial utilities for all
the strategies. The grouping is done using the S-dimensional tensor, where S
is the number of strategies per agent. Assuming that the Reduced Strategy
Space (RSS) [3] is used, rows and columns of the tensor are of length 2P
and each entry is equal to the number of agents holding a different combi-
nation of strategies. The concept of the state that is based on (i) utilities
of pairwise different strategies and, (ii) history of past winning decisions, is
subsequently introduced. Collecting above elements, a set of time-dependent
equations, which reproduce the essential dynamics of the minority game, is
written down. The authors figured out that MG can be interpreted as a
stochastically disturbed deterministic system. To simplify the analysis, the
stochastic term is skipped and attention is paid only to the deterministic
part of the game. Then, the game is called the Deterministic MG. In the
first studies of dynamics it is observed that the microscopic dynamics is af-
fected markedly by the choice of the payoff function. The bahavior of the
game is dictated by realization of distribution of agents over strategies and
not just by specific game parameters. Hence, without knowledge about the
disorder, the game cannot be classified to as being in either the efficient or
inefficient regime. In Ref. [17], the dynamical approach is extended to the
analysis of stochastic terms. The achieved analytical results provide correct
explanation of variance per capita in herd regime, provided linear payoff, but
no description of dynamics or predictabilities is given.
There are some similarities between the crowd-anticrowd theory and our
mesoscopic approach introduced in Ref. [18] and further developed in this
article. We incorporated the same concept of state as in Ref. [19] for the
step-like payoff. We found however that the linear payoff requires different
definition [18]. In the mesoscopic approach we aggregated agents playing the
same strategy into fractions, and treated the fraction as one player. Such
approach allowed us to represent the game in the herd regime as a Markov
process, regardless of the payoff. We found it crucial to incorporate the
stochastic transitions in the model - otherwise it is impossible to describe
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analytically the real dynamics. The mesoscopic approach was developed in
stages, starting with Ref. [18]. First, we examined the system where frac-
tions are of equal sizes. The following statements were proved: (i) the utility
is bounded and the number of states is finite, (ii) the transition probabil-
ities are both stochastic and deterministic. Incorporating these results we
worked out the methodology of how to find the Markov representation of the
process. Our analyses based on dynamics of the utility were mostly limited
to the step-like payoff function and were technically hard to generalize. In
addition, some important macroscopic observables, like demand variance per
capita and predictability, were not yet analyzed and the quenched disorder
was neglected. Here, we extend the method providing the consistent theory
comprising different payoffs and quenched disorder. We start in section 3
where macroscopic differences between games with different payoffs are pre-
sented. The theory of how to describe the game in terms of the Markov
process is provided in section 4. In many cases the explanation of macro-
scopic observables required relaxation of the assumption about equality of
fraction sizes and we proved that such relaxation affects transition proba-
bilities. We found it interesting that increasing the number of players does
not make alike systems with equal and unequal fractions, even if in the lat-
ter case distributions of sizes are symmetric. Our analysis of the attractor
structure of the Markov chain explains this and other dynamical phenomena
observed in the herd regime, viz. oscillations of the aggregate attendance, its
periodicity and predictability, or its dependence on the payoff form. These
results are presented in section 4. The numerical studies of the periodicity
in time are also found in Refs. [8, 20]. More comprehensive review of the
literature is presented in Ref. [21].
2. The Formal Definition of the Minority Game
At each time step t, the n-th agent out ofN (n = 1, . . . , N) takes an action
aαn(t) according to some strategy αn(t). The action aαn(t) takes either of
two values: −1 or +1. An aggregated demand is defined
A(t) =
N∑
n=1
aα′n(t), (1)
where α′n refers to the action according to the best strategy, as defined in
eq. (3) below. Such defined A(t) is the difference between numbers of agents
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who choose the +1 and −1 actions. Agents do not know each other’s actions
but A(t) is known to all agents. The minority action a∗(t) is determined
from A(t)
a∗(t) = −sgnA(t). (2)
Each agent’s memory is limited to m most recent winning, i.e. minority, de-
cisions. Each agent has the same number S ≥ 2 of devices, called strategies,
used to predict the next minority action a∗(t + 1). The sth strategy of the
n-th agent, αsn (s = 1, . . . , S), is a function mapping the sequence µ of the
last m winning decisions to this agent’s action aαsn . Since there is P = 2
m
possible realizations of µ, there is 2P possible strategies. At the beginning of
the game each agent randomly draws S strategies, according to a given dis-
tribution function ρ(n) : n→ ∆n, where ∆n is a set consisting of S strategies
for the n-th agent.
Each strategy αsn, belonging to any of sets ∆n, is given a real-valued
function Uαsn which quantifies the utility of the strategy: the more preferable
strategy, the higher utility it has. Strategies with higher utilities are more
likely chosen by agents.
There are various choice policies. In the popular greedy policy each agent
selects the strategy of the highest utility
α′n(t) = arg max
s:αsn∈∆n
Uαsn(t). (3)
If there are two or more strategies with the highest utility then one of them is
chosen randomly. The highest-utility strategy (3) used by the agent is called
the active strategy, in contrast to passive strategies, unused at given moment.
However, at any time all agents evaluate all their strategies, the active and
passive ones. Each strategy αsn is given the payoff depending on its action
aαsn
Ψαsn(t) = −aαsn(t) g[A(t)], (4)
where g is an odd payoff function, e.g. the steplike g(x) = sgn(x) [2], pro-
portional g(x) = x or scaled proportional g(x) = x/N . The learning process
corresponds to updating the utility for each strategy
Uαsn(t + 1) = Uαsn(t) + Ψαsn(t), (5)
such that every agent knows how good its strategies are.
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3. Macroscopic observables
Macroscopic variables are understood here as random variables resulting
from integration of random variables defined for individuals, over subsets
of degrees of freedom of all individuals in the system. An example of such
variable is the aggregate demand A, defined in the previous section. In this
section we introduce and discuss two other particulary interesting macro-
scopic observables, viz. variance per capita and predictability. The variance
per capita reflects the coordination between agents and is one of the most
intriguing variables due to its nonmonotonic variation as a function of the
control parameter N/P . Generally, variance per capita remains insensitive
to the form of payoff function. In contrast, the predictabilities that detect
the existence of patterns are susceptible to the payoff. Here, we demon-
strate these phenomena paying attention mostly to the numerical results.
The detailed analytical background is given later in section 4. Finally, time
dependencies of the aggregate demand and utilities are presented, providing
an insight into the origin of time patterns.
3.0.1. Observables as functions of the control parameter
The variance per capita for given game is defined using sample taken in
subsequent time steps during time T and assuming ergodicity of the pro-
cess [2, 7]:
σ(A)2 =
1
T
T∑
t=0
A(t)2. (6)
The variance, considered as a function of the control parameter N/2m, rep-
resents a widely discussed result for MGs [2, 7], relevant to economic appli-
cations. For our present study it is important to note that its shape seems
to be insensitive to form of the payoff function, as it is presented for two
different payoffs and m = 3 and m = 7 in Fig. 1. Similar premise for such
payoff-independence is given by another macroscopic observableHa/N , called
predictability, where Ha [22] is defined as
Ha =
1
P
P∑
µ=1
〈a∗|µ〉2, (7)
where 〈a∗|µ〉 is the conditional average of a∗ given µ and the mean is calcu-
lated over all P histories.
7
10−1 100 101 102
10−1
100
101
N/2m
σ
2
/N
10−1 100 101
100
N/2m
σ
2
/N
Figure 1: Variance per capita σ(A)2/N as a function of N/P for S = 2, m = 3 (left)
or m = 7 (right). Two different payoff functions are used; full blue lines correspond to
g(x) = sgn (x) and dashed red lines to g(x) = x. Each point is a mean from ten games,
error bars correspond to one standard deviation and curves are drawn to guide ones eye.
The Ha was demonstrated to be useful in detecting two interesting phases
of the MG:
• The symmetric phase with Ha ≃ 0, where after the particular history
µ(t) both signs of a∗(t) appear with the same frequency. It is often
claimed in literature [22, 16] that if Ha = 0 then patterns in the time
sequence do not exist. We find this condition to be the necessary but
not sufficient one to state the lack of patterns. For example, if every
appearance of given µ is followed by negative and positive minority
decision alternately then Ha = 0 and the predictable pattern exists.
Indeed, such a behavior is observed for the MG in the herd regime and
for g(x) = x [18]. Hence, Ha measures disproportions in frequencies
between positive and negative minority decisions rather than detects
patterns.
• The asymmetric phase with Ha > 0 and existing predictable patterns.
In the asymmetric phase, sign predictions significantly better than ran-
dom are possible.
As presented in Figs 2, plots of Ha/N seem to be independent of the payoff
function, similarly to σ2/N .
By that means it was conjectured in early literature (cf. e.g. Ref. [23])
that only the payoff’s evenness is relevant to the macroscopic observables.
Failure of this hypothesis is visible by analysing a modified macroscopic ob-
servable, we call demand predictability, which may be useful for prediction of
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Figure 2: Predictability per capita Ha/N as a function of N/P for S = 2, m = 3 (left)
or m = 7 (right). Two different payoff functions are used: full blue lines correspond to
g(x) = sgn (x) and dashed red lines to g(x) = x. Each point is a mean from ten games,
error bars correspond to one standard deviation and curves are drawn to guide ones eye.
the sign of demand. This variable is defined as
HA =
1
P
P∑
µ=1
〈A|µ〉2. (8)
Plots of HA/N (cf. Fig. 3) exhibit its spectacular sensitivity to the payoff
function in the effective regime, i.e. high N/P , in contrast to Ha/N and
σ2/N . For further analysis we decompose the conditional expected values
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Figure 3: Demand predictability per capita HA/N as a function of N/P for S = 2, m = 3
(left) or m = 7 (right). Two different payoff functions are used: full blue lines correspond
to g(x) = sgn (x) and dashed red lines to g(x) = x. Each point is a mean from ten games,
error bars correspond to one standard deviation and curves are drawn to guide ones eye.
into components corresponding to decisions +1 and −1:
〈a∗|µ〉 = 〈a∗+|µ〉+ 〈a
∗
−|µ〉, (9)
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where, formally
〈a∗±|µ〉 =
1
T
T∑
t=1
a∗(t) δ
(
µ(t), µ
)
δ
(
a∗(t),±1
)
, (10)
δ(i, j) standing for the Kronecker symbol. Similarly,
〈A|µ〉 = 〈A+|µ〉+ 〈A−|µ〉, (11)
where
〈A±|µ〉 =
1
T
T∑
t=1
A(t) δ
(
µ(t), µ
)
δ
(
sgnA(t),±1
)
. (12)
The case Ha = 0 is possible if 〈a
∗|µ〉 = 0 for every µ which, as seen from
Eq. (9), requires |〈a∗+|µ〉| = |〈a
∗
−|µ〉|. This means that the positive and
negative values of A(t) have to come with the same frequency. Similarly, the
case HA = 0 happens if |〈A+|µ〉| = |〈A−|µ〉| for every µ, i.e. the positive
and negative A mutually compensate (cf. Eq. (11)). Combinations like (i)
Ha = 0 and HA > 0, and (ii) Ha > 0 and HA = 0, are also possible.
3.1. Observables as functions of time
In order to examine MGs in the efficient regime, we performed a series of
numerical simulations with different combinations of game parameters. We
chose three representative cases: (m,N) = (1, 401), (2, 1601), (5, 1601), all
with the number of strategies per agent S = 2. All three games are in the
efficient mode. In the first two cases the condition NS ≫ 2P is fulfilled. In
the third one it is not met and consequences of this fact will become clear
later in the text. In all three experiments the full strategy space is used.
Figs 4, 5 and 6 present results for the steplike payoff function g(x) =
sgn(x): the time evolution of A(t), the autocorrelation function R(τ) and
the scatter plots of A(t+2 · 2m) against A(t), respectively. The same results
for the proportional payoff function g(x) = x are given in Figs 7, 8 and 9.
Even a fleeting glance at Figs 4 and 7 reveals regularities in A(t) for both
payoff functions but more regular and distinct for g(x) = x. In this case
their period increases with the memory length m and their maximal values
are equal to the half of the population size N/2. This periodicity can be
better seen using autocorrelation function R(τ) (cf. Figs 5 and 8) where τ
is the correlation time. The autocorrelation R exhibits statistically periodic
peaks with
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Figure 4: Time evolution of the aggregated demand A(t) for three combinations of the
population size N and agent memory m: N = 401, m = 1 (left), N = 1601, m = 2
(middle) and N = 1601, m = 5 (right). Simulations were done for S = 2 and g(x) =
sgn(x). Preferred values of A are visible for all three games.
0 5 10 15 20
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
τ
R
(τ
)
 
 
0 5 10 15 20
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
τ
R
(τ
)
 
 
0 20 40 60
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
τ
R
(τ
)
 
 
Figure 5: Autocorrelation function R(τ) for three combinations of the population size N
and agent memory m: N = 401, m = 1 (left), N = 1601, m = 2 (middle) and N = 1601,
m = 5 (right). Simulations were done for S = 2 and g(x) = sgn(x). The highest values of
R are for τ = 2 · 2m, except for τ = 0, for all games fulfilling the NS ≫ 2P condition.
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Figure 6: Plots of the aggregated demand A(t + 2 · 2m) vs. A(t) for three combinations
of the population size N and agent memory m: N = 401, m = 1 (left), N = 1601,
m = 2 (middle) and N = 1601, m = 5 (right). Simulations were done for S = 2 and
g(x) = sgn(x). Apparent preferred levels of A(t) are seen as clusters of points. For
m = 1 and m = 2 points tend to flock around diagonals indicating positive correlation for
τ = 2 · 2m.
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Figure 7: Time evolution of the aggregated demand A(t) for three combinations of the
population size N and agent memory m: N = 401, m = 1 (left), N = 1601, m = 2
(middle) and N = 1601, m = 5 (right). Simulations were done for S = 2 and g(x) = x.
Preferred values of A are visible for all three games.
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Figure 8: Autocorrelation function R(τ) for three combinations of the population size N
and agent memory m: N = 401, m = 1 (left), N = 1601, m = 2 (middle) and N = 1601,
m = 5 (right). Simulations were done for S = 2 and g(x) = x. The highest values of R
are for τ = 2 · 2m, except for τ = 0, for all games fulfilling the NS ≫ 2P condition.
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Figure 9: Plots of the aggregated demand A(t+ 2 · 2m) vs. A(t) for three combinations of
the population size N and agent memory m: N = 401, m = 1 (left), N = 1601, m = 2
(middle) and N = 1601, m = 5 (right). Simulation was done for S = 2 and g(x) = x. For
m = 1 and m = 2 points tend to flock around diagonals, indicating positive correlation,
but clusterization of points is not much pronounced.
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periods T = 2 · 2m, as has been already observed in the efficient regime in
Refs. [20, 5]. The autocorrelation is much less pronounced for games which
do not meet the criterion NS ≫ 2P , as seen in Figs 5 and 7 (right). Relax-
ation of this criterion spoils periodicity of the aggregated demand. Similar
observations can be done inspecting the A(t+2 ·2m) vs. A(t) scatter plots in
Figs 6 and 9 where points for games fulfilling NS ≫ 2P condition (left and
middle panels in Figs 6 and 9) are stronger flocked around diagonals.
Another interesting feature of the aggregated demand, seen in the one-
dimensional plots of A(t), and better in the two-dimensional plots A(t+2·2m)
vs. A(t), is an existence of preferred values of A. These preferred values show
up as specles in the two-dimensional plots. The specles are better focused
and more numerous for g(x) = sgn(x) (Fig. 6) than for g(x) = x (Fig. 9).
Time evolution of the utility functions appears to be a strongly mean-
reverting process, independently of the payoff function, as seen e.g. in Figs
10. The more so, for the steplike payoff g(x) = sgn(x) the utility is bounded
to rather narrow belt −2m ≤ U(t) ≤ 2m, where here and in Fig. 10, U(t)
stands for the utility for any strategy. The formal proof of this statement is
given in section 4. This feature is observed for any N and S, provided the
criterion NS ≫ 2P is met.
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Figure 10: Trajectories of the utility function U(t) for all strategies of the MG with S = 2
and m = 1 and N high enough to ensure the NS ≫ 2P regime. Two payoff functions
are shown: the steplike g(x) = sgn (x) (left) and the proportional g(x) = x (right). Lines
correspond to all different strategies. Note difference of vertical scales between panels.
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4. The mesoscopic perspective
In this section we present the effective description of MG by redefining
MG as a Markov chain. The general definition of state is found to be too
complex for analytical treatments (cf. Sec. 4.1.1). Fortunately, in the herd
regime, many agents have identical sets of strategies and their aggregation
is possible. The set of individuals using the same strategies, called fraction,
is further treated as a single agent (cf. Sec. 4.1.2). All possible fractions
exist provided the game is large enough. Knowledge about utilities of pair-
wise different strategies and history of past winning decisions are enough to
predict the action of any fraction. This set of parameters fully characterizes
the system and is considered to specify its state. This definition is strictly
suitable only for a step-like payoff function and can slightly vary for other
payoffs (cf. Secs. 4.2 and 4.3).
Once the representation of the state is known, two methodologies are tried
to explain the observations. In the simplified case we assumed the quenched
disorder [17], i.e. an initial random choice of the strategy set at the start of
the game and its later fixation, and in addition equality of fractions. However,
not all observables are properly explained by that means and an extension
of these assumptions is needed.
Transition probabilities can be calculated in two ways: before and after
assignment of strategies to agents. We thus distinguish between a priori and
a posteriori probability distribution of the aggregate demand.
Using this approach we manage to explain all observed phenomena. Fi-
nally, in Sec. 4.1.3 we define and study stability of this game in order to
understand asymmetries observed in aggregate variables.
4.1. Definitions
4.1.1. The general concept of state
Since the MG represents a system with many degrees of freedom, dimen-
sionality of states is expected to be large. In general, for each time step t,
specification of state x(t) consists of:
A. The history of decisions µ(t),
B. The set of strategies of all agents {αsn}
s=1,...,S
n=1,...,N ,
C. The set of utilities for all strategies of all agents {Uαsn(t)}
s=1,...,S
n=1,...,N ,
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D. A function relating strategies to agents: ρ(n) : n→ ∆n.
Although the history of decisions µ(t) partially stores information about the
past of the process, transition probabilities depend only on the present state
and the process is Markovian.
Substantial reduction of the number of state parameters and simplifica-
tion of state description are possible if the game is large i.e. NS ≫ 2P (cf.
Secs. 4.2 and 4.3).
4.1.2. Fraction – definition and statistical properties
All agents behaving in the same manner - the fraction - can, in a sense,
be treated as a whole. The fraction can be defined in two ways.
In the first approach it is a set of agents possessing a given, all the same,
set of S strategies. The set of pairwise different strategies 2 is denoted as
{βκ}
2P
κ=1. The number of agents in the fraction ν, or the size of this fraction,
is marked as Fν , where ν = {1 . . .G} and G is the total number of different
fractions. In large games, the system comprises agents of all possible fractions
what results in constant G. In general, if strategies are assigned to agents
randomly then Fν are random variables. The strategy space consists of 2
P
possible strategies and G is represented by the number of S-combinations
with repetition: G =
(
2P+S−1
S
)
.
However, such definition of G makes the expected values of the fraction
sizes, E[Fν ], not equal for different fractions, provided that strategies are ran-
domly chosen from the uniform distribution. For example, assuming S = 2,
the fraction with two the same strategies, e.g. {β1, β1}, is two times smaller
than fraction with different strategies β1 and β2, where the ordering of strate-
gies matters: {β1, β2} or {β2, β1}. Therefore in the sequel we use another
definition: the fraction is a set of agents using given sequence of strategies.
The fraction size is now equal to G = 2PS. In such definition the strategy
index s ∈ {1, . . . , S} is dummy. Nevertheless we use this approach because
it radically simplifies the analysis without biasing the outcome, assuming
assigning agents to fractions with equal probabilities. For example, consider
the case S = 2. Fractions’ indexes are assigned to each pair of strategies
arbitrarily, e.g. as presented in Tab 1.
2Two strategies are called different if the Hamming distance between them is not equal
to zero. The number of pairwise different strategies is equal to 2P .
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F : F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8
β : β1, β1 β1, β2 β1, β3 β1, β4 β2, β1 β2, β2 β2, β3 β2, β4
F : F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15 F16
β : β3, β1 β3, β2 β3, β3 β3, β4 β4, β1 β4, β2 β4, β3 β4, β4
Table 1: One of possible assignments between fraction’s indexes and pairs of strategies
If at the beginning of the game strategies are drawn with equal probabilities,
it corresponds to assigning agents to a specific fraction with probabilities
1
G
. Assume W nν ∈ {0, 1} is a random variable equal to 1 if agent n belongs
to fraction ν. Then Fν =
∑N
n=1W
n
ν follows the binomial distribution and
Pr(Fν = fν) =
(
N
fν
)
( 1
G
)fν (1− 1
G
)N−fν . Hence, E[Fν ] = N/G or, if normalized,
E[Fν/N ] = 1/G.
For N → ∞, we have Var[Fν ] → ∞ and Var[Fν/N ] → 0
3. This means
that, asymptotically for large N , (i) the absolute differences between sizes
of fractions grow indefinitely, and (ii) percentages of population assigned to
any fraction are equal. Hence, the larger the population, the larger expected
difference between an actual size of a fraction Fν and its expected value E[Fν ].
4.1.3. Stability
The game is considered stable if for any strategy αn the corresponding
utility Uαn(t) represents a mean-reverting stochastic process, i.e. the time-
average of its increments vanishes after sufficiently long time. The MG has
a build-in stabilization mechanism provided the game is large enough. The
explanation is as follows.
Imagine that a subset Z of strategies (Z ⊂ {β1, . . . , β2P }) gets on average
higher payoff than other subsets and the utilities in Z grow up. Then, there
always exists the same number of anticorrelated strategies with decreasing
utility. The probability that an agent uses one of the strategies with a high
utility is 1 − (#Z/2P )S, compared to those who use strategies with a low
utility (#Z/2P )S [18] (#Z is the number of elements in Z). Since the former
probability is always higher, provided S ≥ 2, then the most of population
uses better strategies and their utility decreases, i.e. the game stabilizes. As
3After normalization the random variable Znν = W
n
ν /N ∈ {0,
1
N
} obeys the Bernoulli
distribution with Pr(Znν = 0) = 1 −
1
G
and Pr(Znν =
1
N
) = 1
G
. Hence, E[Znν ] =
1
GN
and
Var[Znν ] =
1
GN2
(1− 1
G
). Resultantly, Var[Fν/N =
∑N
n=1 Z
n
ν ] =
1
GN
(1− 1
G
).
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long as fraction sizes are close to each other the above mechanism works and
the game stays stable.
4.2. The payoff g(x) = sgn(x)
Here, the concept of the state for payoff g(x) = sgn(x) is introduced. Ap-
plying it allows to represent the game as a Markov process and constitutes a
consistent basis for analytical explanations of phenomena in the herd regime.
4.2.1. The concept of the state
Substantial reduction of the number of state parameters and simplifica-
tion of state description are possible in our case. Agents can use identical
strategies. The expected number of identical strategies in the whole pop-
ulation behaves asymptotically, for N → ∞, like NS/2P . The condition
NS ≫ 2P assures that the game stays in that asymptotic regime and the
number of identical strategies is close to its asymptotic expected value. Iden-
tical strategies have the same utilities over the whole game, provided the
initial values of utilities are the same, e.g. U(0) = 0, for all strategies. It
is thus enough to take into account only reduced set of pairwise different
strategies {βκ}
2P
κ=1 and utilities defined on them, and therefore B and C from
section 4.1.1 can be reduced:
B. {αsn}
s=1,...,S
n=1,...,N −→ {βκ}
2P
κ=1,
C. {Uαsn(t)}
s=1,...,S
n=1,...,N −→ {Uβκ(t)}
2P
κ=1.
Concerning point D, it is sufficient to find probabilities for agents to have
strategies from the set of pairwise different strategies. The probability that
given agent has any particular strategy from this set is equal to 1−(1−1/2P )S.
For large N , the expected number of agents having this strategy is equal to
N(1 − (1 − 1/2P )S). Therefore point D, i.e. a function ascribing strategies
to agents, corresponding to the agent grouping tensor Ω of Ref. [5], can be
dropped out entirely in this case. Note that this expected number in general
differs from the actual number, which has some consequences explained later.
Finally, we describe states using µ(t) and the set of utilities for the com-
plete set of 2P pairwise different strategies {βκ}
2P
κ=1:
x(t) = [µ(t), U1(t), U2(t), . . . , U2P (t) ]. (13)
Similar description of state was used in Ref. [5] but there are two impor-
tant differences between these two: (i) the authors of Ref. [5] introduce a
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functional map giving time evolution of the system in any regime, and (ii)
they degenerate the game by following mean values of demand, thus making
the process deterministic and Markovian, and retaining possibility to ran-
domize it perturbatively. Contrary to them, we do not degenerate the game.
We consider it as a stochastic Markov process and eventually calculate the
probability measure on states for the steplike payoff.
Utilities {Uβκ(t)}
2P
κ=1, considered as functions of time, are called trajec-
tories. In the majority of cases and provided the number of observed time
steps is large enough, strategies can be distinguished by their trajectories.
The sufficient condition for all 2P trajectories Uβκ(t) (0 ≤ t ≤ t0) to be
distinguishable at t0 is that all 2
m possible histories µ appear until then in
a row. On the other hand, appearance of all histories µ until t0, but not
necessarily exclusively, represents a necessary condition of distinguishability
for trajectories. Examples of MGs in the regime NS ≫ 2P are shown in
Figs 10 where trajectories are plotted for m = 1 and S = 2, and for two
payoff functions further studied in this paper: g(x) = sgn(x) and g(x) = x.
4.2.2. Finiteness of the number of states
In this section we demonstrate that for any t the utility for any strategy is
bounded from the bottom and top: Umin ≤ U(t) ≤ Umax, where Umin(max) =
−(+) 2m. At least two approaches are possible. In the first approach one
aggregates agents using strategies of a given utility value. Another one is
based on fractions. Here we elaborate in detail on the former one and only
present the sketch of proof of the latter.
Assume that at given time t two different strategies have the same util-
ities. From Eq. (5) for the steplike payoff function it follows that after one
time step these utilities can either differ by two units or remain the same.
If the initial values of the utilities at t = 0 are the same and after τ time
steps at least one of them attains its extremal value, Umin or Umax, then the
trajectories cover the set of 2m + 1 values (cf. Fig. 10, left)
U(τ) ∈ {ul}
2m+1
l=1
= {2m, 2m − 2, . . . , 2, 0,−2, . . . ,−2m + 2,−2m}. (14)
Using this notation we have u1 = Umax and u2m+1 = Umin. The number of
different strategies characterized by the same ul is given by combinatorics as
the number of trajectories starting from 0 and ending at ul is
#{βκ : Uβκ = ul} =
(
Umax
l − 1
)
, l = 1, . . . , 2m + 1. (15)
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The probability that the active strategy of the n-th agent α′n has utility ul
is equal to
Pr
[
Uα′n(t) = ul
]
=
{
1− Pr
[
Uα′n(t) < ul
]
, l = 1
Pr
[
Uα′n(t) < ul−1
]
− Pr
[
Uα′n(t) < ul
]
, l > 1
(16)
Using argumentation similar to that of Ref. [17], but extended to the full
strategy space, one finds that
Pr
[
Uα′n(t) < ul
]
=
S∏
s=1
[
1− Pr
[
Uαsn(t) ≥ ul
]]
=
[
1−
#{βκ : Uβκ ≥ ul}
2P
]S
, (17)
where, for t = τ ,
#{βκ : Uβκ ≥ ul} =
∑
j≥l
(
Umax
j − 1
)
. (18)
Denoting Prmax(min) = Pr
[
Uα′n(τ) = Umax(min)
]
, one sees from Eq. (16) that
Prmax > Prmin. For any utility ul, different than Umin or Umax, the number of
different strategies (15) is even. Even more, a half of strategies corresponding
to each level Umin < ul < Umax suggests the opposite action than another
half. According to Eq. (16), if two (or more) strategies have the same utility,
then all have the same probability to be the best strategies for the n-th agent.
This means that, if one excludes the best and the worst strategies, a half of
remaining strategies recommends the same action as the best or the worst
strategy. Hence the probability that an agent plays according to the strategy
suggesting the same action as the best strategy is equal to
Pr
[
aα′n(τ) = aαB(τ)
]
= Prmax +
1
2
(
1− Prmax − Prmin
)
=
1
2
(
1 + Prmax − Prmin
)
, (19)
where αB(t) is the best strategy from the whole set of strategies in the game,
i.e. UαB(t) = u1, and 1 − Prmax − Prmin refers to the probability that the
agent’s best strategy is neither the worst nor the best of all strategies. The
factor 1
2
reflects that a half of strategies with non-extremal utilities suggests
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the same action as the best one. As Prmax > Prmin, from Eq. (19) it fol-
lows that if one of strategies has the utility Umax, then more than half of
the population plays according to the best strategy. Subsequently, this sub-
population loose and gets the negative payoff. The rest are the winners and
get the positive payoff. This mechanism bounds the utility to stay between
Umin and Umax. In addition, we know the formula for the fraction of agents
playing the same action. For example, if S = 2 and m = 1 then Prmax =
7
16
and Prmin =
1
16
. Hence, E[A] = 3
8
N .
The analogical results are achieved when the concept of fraction is used.
The number of different strategies characterized by the levels ul follows
Eq. (15). Additionally, for all intermediate levels Umin < ul < Umax there
exists the same number of strategies that suggest +1 and −1. Hence, all
fractions that use one of these intermediate strategies compensate on average
their mutual decisions. The last point is to find the number of fractions that
use the best and the worst strategy, which are equal to 2PS − (2P − 1)S and
1, respectively. For example, for S = 2 and m = 1 there are G = 2PS = 16
fractions: seven using the best strategy and one using the worst one. Hence,
E[A] = 7
16
N − 1
16
N = 3
8
N , in compliance with the previous example.
4.2.3. The Markov process representation
The MG can be described in terms of the Markov process with the finite
number of states. The sgnA(xi) fully defines the utility and µ values of the
next state and takes ±1. But in some specific states A(xi) is always positive
or negative and only one value of sgnA(xi) appears. Hence, the transition
may be either stochastic or deterministic and the transition probability is
equal to
Pr(xj|xi) =
1
2
(
E[sgnA(xi)] + 1
)
. (20)
The probability (20) depends only on the shape of the distribution 4 of A(xi).
Using the concept of fractions, we redefine A(xi) as follows:
A(xi) =
∑
ν
Cν(xi)Fν , (21)
4The lack of explicit dependence of Pr(xj |xi) on xj in Eq. (20) does not mean that
both transition probabilities are the same for stochastic transition. They can be different
for asymmetric distribution of A(xi) (cf. discussion in sec. 4.4.1 below).
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where Cν(xi) ∈ [−1, 1] is a common action of all members of the fraction ν
in the state xi
Cν(xi) =
1
Fν
Fν∑
n=1
aα′n(xi). (22)
In other words, Cν(xi) represents the aggregated demand per capita within
fraction ν. The Cν(xi) depends on the action suggested in the state xi by
the best strategy, or strategies, of the ν -th fraction.
There are the following groups of fractions:
• Fractions with only one best strategy in the state xi. All agents in the
fraction react according to this strategy.
• Fractions with many best strategies where all best strategies in a given
fraction suggest the same action in the state xi. Although agents use
different strategies, they all react identically.
• Fractions with many best strategies, where for each fraction some of
the best strategies suggest the opposite action than another ones in
the state xi. Actions of agents are thus inhomogeneous and an over-
all action of such fraction is a random variable Cν(xi), taking values
cϕν =
−Fν+2ϕ
Fν
for ϕ = {0, . . . , Fν}, where ϕ represents the possible num-
bers of agents acting −1 in the fraction ν. This distribution depends
on a proportion between best strategies suggesting opposite actions.
Assuming there is p+(−) strategies suggesting the positive (negative)
action, the Cν(xi) obeys the binomial distribution
Pr
(
Cν(xi) = c
ϕ
ν
)
=
(
Fν
ϕ
)( p+
p+ + p−
)ϕ( p−
p+ + p−
)Fν−ϕ
, (23)
where E[Cν(xi)] = −1+2
(
p+
p++p−
)
and Var[Cν(xi)] =
4
Fν
(
p+
p++p−
)(
p−
p++p−
)
.
Fractions from the first two groups and suggesting +1 are marked with
d, suggesting −1 are marked with q, and those belonging to the third group
are indexed with w. Hence, Eq. (21) transforms into:
A(xi) =
∑
Fd:Cd(xi)=1
Fd −
∑
Fq:Cq(xi)=−1
Fq
+
∑
Fw:Cw(xi)∈[−1,+1]
Cw(xi)Fw, (24)
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where
Var[A(xi)] = 4
∑
Fw:Cw(xi)∈[−1,+1]
Fw
( p+
p+ + p−
)( p−
p+ + p−
)
. (25)
Further analysis is relatively easy when fractions are of equal sizes and it
complicates if their sizes are random.
The case of equal-size fractions
The system with the same numbers of agents per fraction we call the reference
system and the corresponding MP – the reference MP. The A(xi) is a random
variable which can be expressed as:
A(xi) =
N
G
(
D −Q +
∑
Fw:Cw(xi)∈[−1,+1]
Cw(xi)
)
, (26)
where D and Q refer to the total numbers of fractions from the first two
groups suggesting +1 and −1, respectively. If the state is deterministic then
the components with opposite signs do not compensate and
|D −Q| > max
( ∑
Fw:Cw(xi)∈[−1,+1]
Cw(xi)
)
. (27)
In the limit NS → ∞, inequality (27) is satisfied always when the negative
and positive components are unbalanced, i.e. D 6= Q. This can be proved at
least in two ways.
The general proof uses the strong law of large numbers where the sample
average Cw(xi) converges almost surely to the expected value, i.e.
Pr( lim
N→∞
Cw(xi) = E
[
Cw(xi)
]
) = 1. (28)
Each E
[
Cw(xi)
]
is equal to zero. Therefore the sum over Fw : Cw(xi) ∈
[−1,+1] is equal to zero as well.
Another approach is applicable not only in the limit and requires sep-
arate analyses per state, as given in Example 2. For stochastic transitions
there is always D = Q. For such states, A(xi) has distribution symmet-
ric around zero, ensuring that also distribution of sgnA(xi) is symmetric
and E[sgnA(xi)] = 0. Thus, transitions to two following states are equally
probable.
Knowing how to distinguish the deterministic and stochastic states, the
algorithm of defining the MP is the following:
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1. Consider all 2m initial states. Such states are characterized by Uβκ = 0
for all strategies κ and different histories µ. Due to equality of all
strategies, two minority decisions are equally possible for each of initial
states and the transition is stochastic. These minority decisions deter-
mine strategies that get positive or negative payoff. The updated U
and µ values determine 2m+1 next states.
2. If, in the next state, there are many best pairwise different strategies
suggesting opposite actions, then D = Q and, again, two minority
decisions and two successive states are possible, and the transition is
stochastic. Hence, two next states have to be determined.
3. If, in the next state, there are many best pairwise different strategies
suggesting the same action, then D 6= Q and the minority decision is
determined by this action, and transition is deterministic.
4. If there is only one strategy characterized by the highest value of the
utility, then D 6= Q and the minority decision is determined by the
best strategy, and transition is deterministic.
Here we illustrate how one can find subsequent states and their transition
probabilities using the algorithm presented above (Example 1 ). Next, in the
Example 2 we show how to check step-by-step that the transition is stochas-
tic/deterministic assuming finite number of agents.
Example 1: transition scenarios for m = 1 case
An example realization of the A(t) for the reference MP is given in Fig. 11
(upper left). The estimated A-distribution is symmetric (upper right) and
the distribution of sgn(A) is symmetric likewise (lower right)5. The scatter
plot of A(t+ τ) as a function of A(t), where τ = 2m+1, indicates periodicity
and existence of preferred values of A (lower left). In this case the complete
specification of states and calculation of the transition matrix are relatively
easy. All strategies are listed in Tab. 2. Possible transition scenarios for
the m = 1 MG, represented as the Markov chain, are illustrated in Figs 12.
At the beginning of the game all utilities are equal to zero. Depending
on the history µ, only two initial states can exist: x1 = [−1, 0, 0, 0] and
x2 = [1, 0, 0, 0]. For each of these two states two further scenarios are equally
possible, because the utilities of corresponding strategies are the same. The
5Small asymmetries visible in Fig. 11 are due to finite number of samples used for
estimation.
23
0 50 100 150 200
−200
−150
−100
−50
0
50
100
150
200
t
A
(t
)
−500 0 500
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
A
P
r(
A
)
−200 −150 −100 −50 0 50 100 150 200
−200
−150
−100
−50
0
50
100
150
200
A(t)
A
(t
+
4
)
−2 −1.5 −1 −0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
sgn(A)
P
r(
sg
n
(A
))
Figure 11: Time evolution of the aggregated demand A(t) (upper left), Plots of the ag-
gregated demand A(t + 2 · 2m) vs. A(t) (lower left), Estimated Pr(A) (upper right) and
Pr(sgn(A)) (lower right) for the population size N = 400 and agent memory m = 1, S = 2
strategies per agent and identical sizes of fractions.
µ β1 β2 β3 β4
-1 -1 -1 1 1
1 -1 1 -1 1
Table 2: Strategies for m = 1
choice depends on the ratio between numbers of agents in two groups: one
with a = 1 and another one with a = −1. These scenarios are as follows.
Transition 1
Being in the state x1, the majority of agents use strategies suggesting
a = −1. Then
– the minority action in the next step is a∗ = 1,
– strategies β1 or β2 give negative payoff,
– strategies β3 and β4 give positive payoff.
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Figure 12: Trajectories of utilities for m = 1.
The system goes to the state x3 = [1,−1,−1, 1, 1] (cf. Fig. 12, Tran-
sition 1) where Uβ3 = Uβ4 = 1 and these strategies suggest different
actions on the last history µ = 1. Similarly, there are two strategies
with the utilities Uβ1 = Uβ2 = −1 suggesting different actions on µ = 1.
Hence, there are two equiprobable scenarios, further described as Tran-
sitions 3 and 4.
Transition 2
Being in the state x1, the majority of agents use strategies suggesting
a = 1. Then
– the minority action in the next step is a∗ = −1,
– strategies β3 or β4 give negative payoff,
– strategies β1 and β2 give positive payoff.
The system goes to the state x11 = [−1, 1, 1,−1,−1] (cf. Fig. 12,
Transition 2) where Uβ1 = Uβ2 = 1 and give the same actions on the
last history µ = −1. Most of agents use these strategies (e.g. 3/4 of
the population, provided S = 2) and the sole possibility is that the
system goes to the state x2.
25
Transition 3
Being in the state x3, the majority of agents use strategies suggest-
ing a = 1 and the system passes to x5. In this state Uβ3 = Umax and
Uβ2 = Umin (cf. Fig. 12, Transition 3). According to the reasoning from
section 5.1, if one utility attains its maximal or minimal value, most
agents use strategies suggesting the same action as the best strategy.
Consequently, there is only one scenario possible in x5: the best strat-
egy, and all strategies giving the same output as the best one, loose
and the system goes to the state x4.
Transition 4
Another possibility in x3 is that most of agents decide a = −1 and
the system goes to x7. In this state Uβ4 = Umax and Uβ1 = Umin
(cf. Fig. 12, Transition 4). Subsequently, the best strategy, and all
strategies giving the same output as the best one, loose and the system
goes to the state x9. In x9 both best strategies suggest the same for
the last history µ = −1. The majority of the population uses one of
these best strategies and the system moves to x1.
Transition 5–8
These transitions are analogical to Transitions 1–4, but the initial state
is x2.
The states are listed in Tab. 3. These states and transitions are sufficient
to define a memoryless representation of the MG with a transition graph
displayed in Fig. 13. Some of its states have the same expected demand
E [A] over realizations of the game, e.g. E [A(xi)] = 0 (i = 1, ..., 4), since the
same numbers of agents play according to strategies recommending opposite
actions. Using formulas (16-18) we can find E [A] for all states (cf. Tab. 3),
consistently with observations in Fig. 11, where five clusters on the diagonal
are found around values from Tab. 3. Our process is a stationary Markov
chain for which the stationary Master Equation can be solved with respect
to the state probabilities. Their values are given in Tab. 3, in the column
marked Pr(xi) (i = 1, . . . , 12). The state probabilities from Tab. 3 can be
also used to find statistical periods of the demand
Pr
[
A(t) = A(t+ τ)
]
=
∑
ij
δ
[
A
(
xj(t+ τ)
)
, A
(
xi(t)
)]
· Pr
[
xj(t+ τ) | xi(t)
]
· Pr
[
xi(t)
]
, (29)
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µ U1 U2 U3 U4 Pr(xi) E [A(xi)] Var [A(xi)]
x1 -1 0 0 0 0
1
8
0 N
2
x2 1 0 0 0 0
1
8
0 N
2
x3 1 -1 -1 1 1
1
8
0 N
4
x4 -1 1 -1 1 -1
1
8
0 N
4
x5 -1 0 -2 2 0
1
16
3
8
N N
8
x6 1 0 -2 2 0
1
16
−3
8
N N
8
x7 1 -2 0 0 2
1
16
3
8
N N
8
x8 -1 2 0 0 -2
1
16
−3
8
N N
8
x9 -1 -1 -1 1 1
1
16
1
2
N 0
x10 1 1 -1 1 -1
1
16
1
2
N 0
x11 -1 1 1 -1 -1
1
16
−1
2
N 0
x12 1 -1 1 -1 1
1
16
−1
2
N 0
Table 3: States xi (i = 1, . . . , 12), their probabilities Pr(xi) and demands for m = 1. The
E [A(xi)] stands for the expected value of A for the state xi.
where δ(x, y) stands for the Kronecker symbol. The maximal value of 7/16
is found for τ = 4 and this explains why the largest correlation is found also
for τ = 4 (cf. Figs 5 and 8).
Example 2: Deterministic transitions
Here, we show an example how to prove that the transition from a given state
is deterministic provided that the system is a reference one and the game is
in herd regime but not necessarily in the limit NS → ∞. Additionally,
we present that the transition can change if agents are assigned to fractions
randomly.
Let us consider an arbitrarily chosen state for S = 2 and m = 1 where the
transition is deterministic, e.g. x5 defined as x5 = [−1, 0,−2, 2, 0]. Assume
that fractions’ indexes are assigned to each pair of strategies according to
Tab. 1. Analyzing each fraction one finds that:
• For fractions F11, F12, F15, F16 both strategies suggest +1. Hence Cν(xi) =
+1, for ν ∈ {11, 12, 15, 16}.
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Figure 13: Diagrams of the Markov chain representation of the MG in the efficient regime
for m = 1. Numbers in circles represent the following states: x1 = [−1, 0, 0, 0, 0], x2 =
[1, 0, 0, 0, 0], x3 = [1,−1,−1, 1, 1], x4 = [−1, 1,−1, 1,−1], x5 = [−1, 0,−2, 2, 0], x6 =
[1, 0,−2, 2, 0], x7 = [1,−2, 0, 0, 2], x8 = [−1, 2, 0, 0,−2], x9 = [−1,−1,−1, 1, 1], x10 =
[1, 1,−1, 1,−1], x11 = [−1, 1, 1,−1,−1], x12 = [1,−1, 1,−1, 1]. States marked as grey
incorporate µ = −1 while the white ones µ = +1. Values assigned to arrows reflect
transition probabilities. Two cases are shown: equal fractions (left) and unequal ones where
agents draw strategies with uniform probability (right). In the case of equal fractions, if
transitions to two states are possible from a given state, both transition probabilities are
the same.
• For fractions F3, F7, F8, F9, F10, F14 strategy with higher U suggests +1.
As a result for these strategies Cν(xi) = +1, for ν ∈ {3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14}.
• In fractions F1, F2, F5, F6 both strategies suggest −1. Thus Cν(xi) =
−1, for ν ∈ {1, 2, 5, 6}.
• Finally, fractions F4, F13 have two strategies with equal probabilities
but suggesting opposite actions. Hence, Cν(xi), for ν ∈ {4, 13}, follows
binomial distribution (23).
For the reference system (equal fractions) one can calculate E[A(x5)] =
5
16
N .
The uncertainty is introduced by agents belonging to fractions F4, F13 because
they choose −1 or +1 with the same probability. It means that A(x5) ∈
{ 3
16
N . . . 5
16
N} and Var[A(x5)] = N/8. Hence, A(x5) is always positive and
a∗(x5) = −1, thus the successor state is determined unambiguously. Such
analysis can be performed for arbitrary state which makes easy calculation
of variance of the aggregate demand (cf. Tab. 3).
Any MG with m > 1 in the efficient regime can be represented as a
Markov process with a finite number of states. The same method as for
m = 1, but more demanding computationally, can be used to calculate state
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probabilities. The reasoning presented is strictly true only in the ideal case
where subpopulations of agents in different fractions are equal, or if the sys-
tem is considered a priori, i.e. before strategies are assigned to agents at the
beginning of the game. In a posteriori analysis we consider the game where
strategies are already assigned. In most cases such game is characterized by
an inequality between sizes of fractions due to the initial randomness in the
strategies’ generation process (quenched disorder). In Example 2, consider-
ing system a priori, the expected value E[A(x5)] remains the same but the
variance changes distinctly enough to allow for appearance of negative sam-
ples. Considered a posteriori, also E[A˜(x5)] is most likely biased compared to
E[A(x5)]. We show that some interesting phenomena, among them the sensi-
tivity of the predictability HA to the payoff, appear only when the quenched
disorder is taken into account i.e. imbalance between fractions exists.
The case of unequal-size fractions
If strategies are assigned randomly to agents then fraction sizes are likely
to be unequal. Let us consider one of the simplest cases where strategies
are drawn with equal probabilities, which corresponds to assigning an agent
to any fraction with the probability 1
G
. Interestingly, numerical experiments
show that in this case the reconstructed MP usually follows the sequence of
states of the reference MP but the values of transition probabilities are not
reproduced. This bias does not disappear even if the game is enlarged (see
Figs 11 and 14). The explanation is as follows.
States in the reference MP, where stochastic transition appears, are char-
acterized by the same number of positive and negative components in formula
(24). Calculating the transition probability we considered two cases: before
and after assignment of strategies to agents, i.e. the a priori and a posteriori
one.
Calculating a priori expected value of sgnA we do not know yet the
specific number of agents in the ν-th fraction and we just operate on random
variables:
E[sgnA(xi)] = E
[
sgn
∑
ν
Cν(xi)Fν
]
= E
[
sgn
( ∑
Fd:Cd(xi)=1
Fd −
∑
Fq:Cq(xi)=−1
Fq
+
∑
Fw:Cw(xi)∈[−1,+1]
Cw(xi)Fw
)]
(30)
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Figure 14: Time evolution of the aggregated demand A(t) (upper left), Plots of the ag-
gregated demand A(t + 2 · 2m) vs. A(t) (lower left), Estimated Pr(A) (upper right) and
Pr(sgn(A)) (lower right) for the population size N = 400 and agent memory m = 1, S = 2
strategies per agent and unequal sizes of fractions.
Each fraction size Fν obeys the same binomial distribution. Since we consider
stochastic transitions in the reference system, then there is the same number
of elements in the first and second sum of Eq. (30). The distribution of the
third sum is symmetric around zero because it contains pairwise symmetric
components. Thus, the distribution of A(xi) is also symmetric, as well as the
distribution of sgnA(xi). By that means E[sgnA(xi)] = 0.
When strategies are assigned to agents, then the numbers of agents in
fractions, fν , are known and the system is considered as a posteriori. The
E[sgnA(xi)] can be decomposed:
E[sgnA(xi)] = E
[
sgn
( ∑
fd:Cd(xi)=1
fd −
∑
fq:Cq(xi)=−1
fq
+
∑
fw:Cw(xi)∈[−1,+1]
Cw(xi)fw
)]
. (31)
Provided S = 2, the last sum in Eq. (31) is symmetric around zero due to
Cw symmetry but the first two sums introduce a bias, shifting distribution of
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A(xi). If S > 2 then also the third term may be biased. Since Var[F ]→∞
for N →∞, then considering only first two components one gets
Var[
∑
Fd:Cd(xi)=1
Fd −
∑
Fq:Cq(xi)=−1
Fq]→∞, (32)
which means that the probability of a large bias grows indefinitely with N .
If the a posteriori distribution of A(xi) is shifted then the a posteriori
distribution of sgnA(xi) is asymmetric, regardless of a symmetry of the last
term. Consequently, most likely E[sgnA(xi)] 6= 0. The equality between
E[sgnA(xi)] calculated using a priori distribution and E[sgnA(xi)] calcu-
lated using distribution a posteriori occurs only if numbers of agents per
fraction are equal for all fractions. In other cases the expected absolute bias
of distribution increases with N and probabilities in stochastic transitions
are most likely unequal. In some experiments we found that for specific
states the bias can shift the distribution so heavily that it is always posi-
tive or negative. Therefore the state, being a priori stochastic, may become
deterministic when analyzed a posteriori.
Finally, consider the states with deterministic transitions in the reference
system. If now F is a random variable, then with some, usually very small,
probability the transition becomes stochastic due to the specific realization
of F . The analysis of one specific state is given in Example 2 of the present
section.
4.2.4. Stochasticity of the game depends on initial conditions
We assumed that Uαsn(t = 0) = 0 for all α
s
n. This assumption seems nat-
ural as reflecting no a priori preference for any strategy. However, it appears
to be critical for the MG dynamics for g(x) = sgn(x). Stochastic transitions
show up for the degenerate state, i.e. with more than one strategy with
the same utility. Removing this ambiguity suppresses stochasticity and the
game becomes deterministic. In such a case, our simplified description of
the state fails because strategies have unique utilities and cannot be aggre-
gated. Consequently, the Markovian treatment, as presented in Sec. 4.2.3, is
no longer useful but its description in terms of the Markov process, defined
as for proportional payoff g(x) = x, becomes interesting. In particular, the
game follows the Eulerian path on de Bruijn graph and is deterministic (cf.
Sec. 4.3).
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4.2.5. Stability of the game and behaviour of the predictability H
Disproportions in fractions affect transition probabilities. If the absolute
disproportions are very large then some transitions, which exist in the refer-
ence system, can disappear and the graph is reduced to its subgraph. The
game remains stable because each subgraph is characterized by sequence of
states assuring that +1 and −1 appear after given µ with the same frequency
(cf. white and grey circles, respectively, in Fig. 13). Equality of frequencies
of the opposite minority decisions after any µ, is both the necessary and
sufficient condition to assure stability, provided g(x) = sgn(x). Hence, the
stability entails the same frequencies, resulting with 〈a∗|µ〉 = 0. No matter
whether the system is the reference one or not – the Ha is always equal to
zero, provided the game is stable. The above mechanism works as long as the
game is deep in herd regime, i.e. NS ≫ 2P , and if strategies are drawn from
the uniform distribution or the one close to it. If game moves to the cooper-
ation mode, or strategies are drawn from an asymmetric distribution, then
the methodology of MP breaks down because relative disproportions between
fractions are large. This distorts stability and additional states appear.
The stability mechanism requires balance between frequencies of the neg-
ative and positive signs of A after any µ, regardless of the value of A. The
〈A|µ〉 in formula (8) can be redefined as follows:
〈A|µ〉 ≃
#Xµ∑
i=1
E
[
A(xµi )
]
Pr(xµi ), (33)
where Xµ is the set of all states xµi including history µ. Approximation (33)
is based on replacing each partial sum of random variable in state xµi , A(x
µ
i ),
by its expected value in this state, E [A(xµi )]. Eq. (33) is strict in the limit
of infinite time, T →∞.
Analyzing the system a posteriori,
∑
xµi ∈X
µ E [A(x
µ
i )]Pr(x
µ
i ) = 0 only in
the case of equal fractions, because there always exists a pair of states with
the same µ, the same probabilities and symmetric distributions around zero.
The larger the game, the larger possible disproportions of E [A(xµi )] between
the reference and the real system, provided that in the real system strategies
are drawn from flat distribution. As a result,
∑#Xµ
i=1 E [A(x
µ
i )]Pr(x
µ
i ) grows
with the population size. Hence, HA as a function of the control parameter
n = N/P is larger than zero in the herd regime, if the system is different
than the reference one.
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4.2.6. Variance per capita σ2/N
For simplicity, we consider here only the case of equal fractions and do
not distinguish between a priori and a posteriori games. The variance per
capita (6) is defined using the sum over the set of all states X . If game is
large enough, then a suitable approximation based on the MP representation
is given by
σ2(A) ≃
#X∑
i=1
Pr(xi)E
[
A(xi)
]2
(34)
=
#X∑
i=1
Pr(xi)
(
N
G
E
[ G∑
ν=1
Cν(xi)
])2
. (35)
In derivation of Eq. (34) from Eq. (6) we use expansion of σ2(A) into the
sum of partial sums over states and the fact that variation of E [A(xi)] from
state to state is significantly larger than the width of distribution of A in
any state (cf. Figs 11 and 14, upper right). More detailed explanation is as
follows.
In Eq. (6), each value of demand A(t) is generated in one of K possible
states. Assuming ergodicity, the sum over time steps t in Eq. (6) (t =
0, . . . , T ) can be represented as a sum over all T visits in states xk (k =
1, . . . , K and K = #X). Since each state is visited many times, the sum
over visits in states can be decomposed into partial sums over states
σ(A)2 =
1
T
T∑
t=0
A(t)2
=
K∑
k=1
1
Ik
Ik∑
ik=1
A(xik)
2
≃
K∑
k=1
E [A(xk)
2], (36)
where ik runs over subsequent moments when the system is in the k-th state
and Ik stands for the number of visits in this state. For any state xk the
random variable A(xk) can be represented as a sum
A(xk) = E [A(xk)] + η(xk), (37)
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where η(xk) is a random variable and E [η(xk)] = 0. Hence
E [A(xk)
2] = E [A(xk)]
2 + E [η(xk)
2]. (38)
Since, depending on the state (see Tab. 3),
E [A(xk)]
2 ∼ 0 or N2,
E [η(xk)
2] ∼ N or 0, (39)
(40)
the second term in Eq. (38) may be neglected for large N and one arrives at
Eq. (34).
In order to guide intuition, let us consider example from Fig. 11 (upper
right). This joint distribution of A is a sum of distributions for twelve states.
Five distinct peaks correspond to distributions ofA in groups of states. States
corresponding to peaks, as well as expected values of A2 and η2, are given in
Tab. 4.
Peak (from left) States xk, k = 1, .., 12 E [A(xk)]
2
E [η(xk)
2], k = 1, .., 12
1 x11,12 (−N/2)
2 0
2 x8,6 (−3N/8)
2 ∼ N
3 x1,2,3,4 0 ∼ N
4 x5,7 (3N/8)
2 ∼ N
5 x9,10 (N/2)
2 0
Table 4: Squared expected values of A and expected values of η2 for five peaks seen in
Fig. 11 (upper right).
The number of fractions where all strategies suggest the same action after
given µ is always (2P−1)S, where 2P−1 represents the half of the strategy
space where all strategies suggest the same action. Hence, at least, 2(2P−1)S
terms in Cν in the sum (34) compensate mutually. By that means there is
2PS − 2(P−1)S+1 terms which in the worst case are not compensated. Indeed,
one can find states where all actions of these fractions are equal to +1 or −1,
but also states where contributions of all fractions compensate to 0. Hence
0 ≤ |
G∑
j=1
Cν(xi)| ≤ 2
PS − 2(P−1)S+1, (41)
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where the upper boundary can be factorized into 2PS(1 − 21−S), and only
the number of different fractions G = 2PS depends on P . In particular, for
S = 2, 3, 4, 5 this factor is equal to G
2
, 3
4
G, 7
8
G, 15
16
G, respectively.
Generally:
E [A(xi)] ∼ N. (42)
As a result, in Eq. (34), σ2 ∼ N2 and σ2/N ∼ N , in agreement with numerical
simulations [7] and theoretical results [17, 14, 15].
The variance is no longer proportional to N2 if game leaves the herd
regime. In the random mode, there is less agents than fractions and therefore:
σ2(xi) =
N∑
n=1
Var [aα′n(xi)]. (43)
Considering further the case S = 2, on average the half of agents do not
have choice because they have two strategies suggesting the same action.
Decisions in this half of the population compensate mutually and do not
influence A. There are states where the rest of the population has a choice
and thus σ2(xi) =
∑N/2
n=1Var [aα′n(xi)]. Hence, σ
2 ∼ N
2
.
In the cooperation regime, most of fractions are in game but fluctuations
of F are still relatively large. Thus, there are fractions more and less pop-
ulated. Strategies that are in less populated fractions win more frequently.
The impact of these fractions is compensated by larger fractions and there-
fore the variance is minimal. It reflects the balance between the crowd and
anticrowd in the so called crowd-anticrowd approach [17].
4.3. The payoff g(x) = x
The linear payoff g(x) = x requires different methods of analysis than the
steplike one. For g(x) = sgn(x), in each state there are strategies suggesting
different actions with the same utility. If an agent has two or more best
strategies with the same utility then it chooses one of them randomly. As a
result, some transitions are stochastic. The more so, the utility is bounded
from the bottom and top: Umin ≤ U(t) ≤ Umax, where Umin(max) = −(+) 2
m.
The number of values of utility is relatively small. For g(x) = x, the prob-
ability that the pairwise different strategies have the same utility is small,
compared to the case of g(x) = sgn(x), and the range of possible U is much
wider, from −N/2 to N/2, provided that the system is the reference one. Re-
sultantly, stochasticity of transitions disappears almost completely but the
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game is still periodic. A persuasive explanation of periodicity is proposed
by the authors of Ref. [5] using de Bruijn representation of the memory se-
quences µ. Here we extend their analysis and explain the dynamics of A(t)
by introducing a novel definition of the state.
4.3.1. The initial phase
All steps with more then one strategy with the same utility are called
initial. If U(t = 0) = const for all strategies, then some initial steps are
necessary to split all utilities of pairwise different strategies. Now we show
that the minimal number of such steps is 2m and the maximal is 2m+1.
Identical utilities of two different strategies at time t can either differ by
2A(t) or remain the same at t + 1. They differentiate when corresponding
pairwise different strategies suggest opposite actions after µ(t). Therefore
the shortest time to split utilities of all 2P strategies is 2m. Such scenario
requires appearance of all possible histories µ without any repetitions.
If strategies react in such way that their utilities do not split from step
t to t + 1, then it means that the same µ appears twice. Resultantly, the
strategies that won in step t have to lose in step t + 1, due to the positive
change of the utility and being preferable to the majority of the population
at time t + 1. Thereby the sign of A(t + 1) changes, compared to the sign
of A(t), and different µ has to appear. There is only one µ for which given
half of different strategies reacts identically and for any other µ they have to
split. Example of both scenarios is presented in Fig. 15, where strategies are
defined as in Tab. 2. The first scenario is relatively easy to follow and we
focus on the second one. The initial value is µ(0) = 1 and all strategies have
the same utility U = 0. Each agent at t = 0 draws one strategy randomly. Let
us assume that most of them decide to use the strategy suggesting a(0) = −1.
As a result (i) β2 and β4 get positive payoff and, (ii) the next history is µ = 1
(cf. Tab. 1). After µ = 1 both winning strategies suggest the same action
and lose. So the next history is µ = −1. Since the history changed, the
glued strategies have to react differently because two different µ’s cannot
cause the same reaction of all strategies. Thus, the longest time to split all
U trajectories is 2m+1 and requires every possible history to appear twice.
4.3.2. The concept of the state
At any step of the game one can rank all pairwise different strategies as
the best, second best, third best, etc. Sizes of fractions corresponding to
these strategies are known [17, 18]. An ordered list of indexes of different
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Figure 15: The shortest (left) and longest (right) scenario of the initial phase for m = 1
and µ(0) = 1.
strategies, complemented by µ value, is sufficient to fully describe the game
at a given moment and can be used as a characteristics of the state. Formally,
assume {βκ}
2P
κ=1 is the set of pairwise different strategies indexed arbitrarily.
There exists the sorting operator ω(κ)→ l, ordering strategies according to
their utilities, such that lβk stands for the position of the strategy βκ in the
ordered list. Then the state is as follows
x(t) = [µ(t), lβ1(t), . . . , lβ2P (t) ]. (44)
The total number of states is equal to P
∏2P /2−1
κ=0 (2
P − 2κ) and accounts
for all possible orders of P strategies, provided each strategy has its anti-
strategy 6, where the pair consisting of the strategy and its anti-strategy is
characterized by the normalized Hamming distance equal to one.
As prevalent number of strategies have unique utility, the probability (16)
for the active strategy α′n can be simplified (cf. also Ref. [17])
Pr
[
Uα′n(t) = ul
]
=
(
1−
l − 1
2P
)S
−
(
1−
l
2P
)S
, l ≥ 1. (45)
6First arbitrarily chosen strategy from the set of 2P strategies can be placed on one
of 2P positions in the ordered list. When the position of the given strategy is chosen,
then the position for its anti-strategy is chosen automatically. Next, the strategy from the
reduced set of 2P − 2 strategies is placed in one of 2P − 2 positions, and so forth. Each
level occurs with different µ and there are P different µ’s.
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As a result, in the limit N →∞ about N Pr
[
Uα′n(t) = ul
]
agents use the l-th
best strategy. Subsequently, analysis of actions of strategies provides values
of the aggregate demand in each state. Consider, for example, the case when
A is the largest possible. Since {ul} is a sorted list of utilities, this is possible
if the first l/2 strategies in this list suggest actions opposite to the last l/2.
Then the probability of an action suggested by the best strategy is equal to
Pr
[
aα′n(t) = aαB(t)
]
=
2P−1∑
l=1
Pr
[
Uα′n(t) = ul
]
= 1−
1
2S
. (46)
This means that for large NS for about N(1− 1
2S
) agents their active strategy
is the same as the best strategy and the absolute value of the aggregated
demand is equal to
|A| = N
(
1−
1
2S−1
)
. (47)
In particular, if S = 2 then |A| = N/2.
4.3.3. De Bruijn representation
We know that U trajectories represent mean-reverting processes. Thus,
the state space (44) is projected onto the subspace x(t) = µ(t) and the
dynamics of the MG can be efficiently studied using de Bruijn graphs, as
shown in Ref. [24]. The decision history µ(t) is a sequence of m minority
actions
µ(t) =
[
a∗(t−m), a∗(t−m+ 1), . . . , a∗(t− 1)
]
. (48)
The µ(t+ 1) is obtained by adding a∗(t) to the right and deleting a∗(t−m)
from the left of the vector (48), such that there are two possible successors
µ(t + 1) of µ(t). If one history can be obtained from another one using this
procedure, then the latter has a directed edge to the former one. Histories
may be represented by labelled edges. These rules define de Bruijn graph of
the order m. Examples for m = 1 and m = 2 are given in Figs 16.
Histories in MGs are not equiprobable [24]. Among all paths on the
de Bruijn graph of the game, Euler paths define the shortest sequence of his-
tories where each strategy loses and wins equally likely. In the non-Eulerian
paths some histories are more frequent and therefore some strategies are
more profitable. We show in the following that in the efficient mode the
non-Eulerian paths are rare compared to the Eulerian ones.
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Figure 16: De Bruijn graphs of orders m = 1 (left) and m = 2 (right). Dashed lines
represent examples of the Euler trails on the graph: one trail for m = 1 (left) and one of
two possible Euler trails for m = 2 (right)
4.3.4. Algorithm generating strong demand fluctuations
We noticed that large fluctuation of A is only possible if the game is in
one of two de Bruijn nodes called homogeneous, i.e. consisting of identical
symbols: µh1(2) =
[
− (+)1, . . . ,−(+)1
]
. Interesting enough, peaks are ob-
servable only after one of the homogenous histories, but not after both. In
Fig. 17 we present the flow chart illustrating appearance of strong fluctu-
ations of A(t). Below we describe the algorithm step by step. First three
stages lead to the first peak. Next steps explain why the subsequent peaks
follow each other and why they have opposite signs.
Stage 1
If A(t1) stands for the first peak of demand then three prior conditions
have to be fulfilled. The first is that µ(t1 − 1) = µh1(2), where µh1(2) =
[−(+)1, . . . ,−(+)1] is a homogeneous node.
Stage 2
It is also required that at t1 − 1 majority of agents decides to change
the node. If this is fulfilled then the minority action is
a∗(t1 − 1) =
{
−1, µ(t1 − 1) = µh1
1, µ(t1 − 1) = µh2
. (49)
Hence µ(t1) = µ(t1−1), the minority action is to stay in the same node
and gives the positive payoff to the winning strategy
Rαsn(t1 − 1) = −aαsnA(t1 − 1). (50)
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Figure 17: The flow chart of the MG evolution algorithm, illustrating appearance of distinct
peaks of demand.
Stage 3
There is a non-zero probability that strategies corresponding to the
first l/2 utilities in {ul} have won in the last step. Such circumstance
is possible provided stages 1 and 2 are realized. If this third condition
is fulfilled then we mark such history µC . Then all first l/2 strategies
suggest the same reaction after µC . Hence the majority decision at
t1 is to stay in the node and the maximal demand (cf. Eq. (46)) is
generated. All strategies with high utility get the penalty and the low-
utility ones are rewarded by the same amount. The game follows the
minority decision and escapes from the de Bruijn node µC . When the
game leaves µC , the strategy set is split into two groups of high and
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low utility, as illustrated in Fig. 18. In the next steps the game goes to
µ 6= µC.
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Figure 18: The time evolution of the utilities (left) and the aggregated demand (right) for
the MG with N = 1601, S = 2, m = 2 and g(x) = x. Grey solid trajectories represent
strategies reacting in the same way after particular history µC. Black dashed trajectories
represent anti-correlated strategies reacting in the opposite way after µC . The appearance
of µC is in t = 105 and 106 and then after every 2
m+1 steps.
Stage 4
Next steps do not substantially affect utilities as long as the history µC
does not reappear. There is no history other than µC assuring that the
first l/2 strategies in the {ul} list suggest a collective action resulting
with the most spiky demand. Hence, after t1, the variations of A do not
affect the utility significantly until the µC reappears at t2 > t1 and when
the set of the best l/2 strategies is the same as at t1. Then the l/2 best
strategies suggest the game to shift to another node characterized by
history µ(t2+1) 6= µC and the maximal demand |A(t2)| = N(1−
1
2S−1
)
is generated. All the l/2 best strategies get penalty proportional to
the absolute value of the aggregated demand. Concurrently, the l/2
strategies with the lowest utility are rewarded with the same amount
(cf. Fig. 18).
Stage 5
Next, the game follows the edge leading to the same node. Subse-
quently, the l/2 best strategies suggest staying in the same vertex µC .
Again, high absolute value of demand is generated but the sign of
A(t2 + 1) is opposite to the sign of A(t2). Consequently, all strategies
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with high U(t2+1) get penalty N(1−
1
2S−1
) and, concurrently, strategies
with low utility get reward of the same size.
Stage 6
The game goes to the vertex µC(t2 + 2) 6= µC and stages 4–6 repeat.
Since high A(t) appears only after the history µC , we have just two tran-
sitions in the Eulerian path starting from this history. From this it follows
that the frequency of peaks is equal to
f =
2
2m+1
=
1
2m
, (51)
in agreement with our simulations. The value 2m+1 is the length of the Euler
path and it corresponds to the period of A observed in Figs. 7-9.
4.3.5. The Markov process representation
The case of equal-size fractions
As pointed out in Sec. 4.2, rewards and penalties have to compensate if the
game is stable. This requires specific order of states (cycle), such that every µ
has to appear twice over the cycle, in order to assure the same magnitudes of
reward and penalty for any strategy. Such cycles are considered as attractors
because, as we will see, they tend to pull in other initial states. The question
is: how many attractors exist and how one can find them? At least two
ways of dealing with the problem are possible for equal-size fractions. The
first is a brute force method where for each state its successor is determined.
But usefulness of this method is limited only to small m. Another approach
requires analysis of the Euler paths on de Bruijn graph and is applicable for
any m. We will show subsequently that the number of attractors is two times
larger than the number of Euler paths. Below are examples of both methods.
We present the brute force method for m = 1 and strategies defined as
in Tab. 2. For simplicity, we use abridged notation for the state, e.g. −3412
stands for [−1, 3, 4, 1, 2]. Each state has to be analyzed and its successor
has to be found. Fig. 19 presents relations between states. There are two
attractors:
Attractor 1 = [+4231,−3142,−1324,+3142] (52)
Attractor 2 = [+4321,−3412,−1234,+3412] (53)
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Figure 19: Two basins of attraction for m = 1 (left). Attractors are marked by grey
arrows. Both attractors are projected to the same Euler path in de Bruijn graph (right).
For simplicity, we use abridged notation for the state, e.g. −3412 stands for [−1, 3, 4, 1, 2].
Both attractors are equally possible, provided that U(t = 0) = const for
all strategies. Each attractor assures that every possible history appears
twice. One appearance rewards half of strategies and another one penalizes
them. Each reward and subsequent penalty are of the same magnitude.
Moving along attractors assures that the game follows the Euler trail in the
de Bruijn graph, consistently with results of Refs. [5, 24]. An example of U
trajectories corresponding to these attractors is presented in Fig. 20. The
U(t)
t
1      1      -1     -1 1
+3142  +4231  -3142  -1324  +3142x(t):
(t):
U(t)
t
-1      -1     1    1 -1
-3412  -1234 +3412  +4321  -3412x(t):
(t):
Figure 20: Utility trajectories for two possible attractors for m = 1.
absolute changes of utilities in analyzed case m = 1 are equal to one of
two values: N/2 or N/4, depending on state. In the former case, both best
strategies suggest the same action. Thus the 3/4 of population acts according
to these actions and an aggregate demand is equal to |A| = 3
4
N − 1
4
N = N
2
.
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Figure 21: Time evolution of the aggregated demand A(t), estimated Pr(A) and
Pr(sgn(A)) for the population size N = 400, agent memory m = 1, S = 2 strategies
per agent, identical sizes of fractions (reference system) and linear payoff g(x) = x
In the latter case, the first and the third strategy suggest the same action.
Hence, the 10
16
of the population chooses the same action and consequently
|A| = 10
16
N− 6
16
N = N
4
. Exemplified realization for m = 1 is shown in Fig. 21.
It is seen that both distributions, A and sgn(A), are symmetric. Since the
game is fully deterministic, each of four states x1 . . . x4 is related to only one
value of A(x). Hence, the A distribution has four peaks.
More general way to determine the number of attractors is to count the
number of Eulerian paths in de Bruijn graph. Each attractor consists of the
unique set of states that do not appear in other attractors. We proved in
Sec. 4.3.4 that each attractor comprises of exactly one state characterized by
the large oscillation 7 |A| = N(1 − 1
2S−1
). This state has to incorporate the
µ representing one of the two possible homogenous nodes of the de Bruijn
7A large oscillation is explicitly connected with a state characterized by half of best
strategies suggesting the same action.
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Figure 22: Time evolution of the aggregated demand A(t), plots of the estimated Pr(A) and
Pr(sgn(A)) for the population size N = 400 and agent memory m = 1, S = 2 strategies
per agent and unequal sizes of fractions.
graph. As a consequence, there are two different states belonging to two dif-
ferent attractors where both attractors are projected on the same Eulerian
path in de Bruijn graph. According to the theory of de Bruijn sequences,
there is 22
m
/2m+1 Eulerian paths [25]. Hence, there is twice that many at-
tractors, 22
m
/2m, e.g. there are 2, 4 and 32 attractors for m = 1, 2 and 3,
respectively.
The case of unequal-size fractions
The size of different fractions most likely varies for strategies drawn randomly.
This shifts the a posteriori A distribution with respect to that of the reference
system. The mechanism is the same as for the steplike payoff. Consequently,
in each state belonging to the attractor, the values of A are different than in
the case of equal-size fractions. If the game follows an attractor, the A would
not compensate to zero along the path and the utility values would grow or
shrink indefinitely. The minority mechanism stabilizes the game and prevents
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such scenario by adding states to the attractor. Exemplified realization for
the case, where strategies are drawn from uniform distribution, is shown
in Fig. 22. It is seen that both Pr(A) and Pr(sgn(A)) are asymmetric if
distributions are considered a posteriori. The comparison of Markov chains,
where sizes of fractions are equal and different, is shown in Fig. 23. It is seen
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Figure 23: Two possible attractors for m = 1 (left) for game with equal sizes of fractions.
The transition graph for a real game where sizes are unequal, i.e. strategies are drawn
from uniform distribution (right).
that the game with unequal fractions mostly follows attractor 1 (red arrows)
but in three of four states transitions to other states can appear either. The
probability of these transitions is relatively small, indicating that sizes of
fractions do not differ a lot. The MP representation for unequal fractions is
different for each realization.
4.3.6. The variance per capita σ2/N
We proved in Sec. 4.3.4 that large oscillations are periodic and equal to:
|A| = N
(
1−
1
2S−1
)
. (54)
In particular, if S = 2 then σ2 ∼ N
2
4
, consistently with observations and
results of Ref. [17].
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The argumentation in Sec. 4.3.4 becomes strict and Eq. (46) is exact in
the efficient mode when NS ≫ 2P , ideally in the limit NS →∞. But we also
observe cyclic peaks of demand for N = 1601 and m = 5, when the efficiency
condition is not met (cf. Fig. 7, right). In fact, the condition NS ≫ 2P can
be slacken off to the requirement that the population is numerous enough
that the game is in the herd mode. Games in that mode do not follow
Eulerian paths because for smaller N the pool of strategies is too sparse and
some histories occur more frequently. Nevertheless, the mechanism of peak
creation is approximately preserved, as long as N is large enough to cause the
split of utilities into two groups. At any time a somewhat simpler explanation
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Figure 24: The time evolution of the aggregated demand (upper left) and utilities for
three cases: an agent with one high- and one low-utility strategy (upper right), two low-
utility strategies (lower left) and two high-utility strategies (lower right) at t = 1000.
These three cases may be quantitatively distinguished using the values of utilities at t =
1000, corresponding to the location of the first maximum of A(t) in the upper left panel.
Simulation was performed for the MG with N = 1601, S = 2, m = 5 and g(x) = x.
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of large oscillations may be given by dividing strategies into two categories:
the good with the positive payoff, and bad with negative. Probability that
an agent has no good strategies, or at least one good, is equal to 1
2S
and
1− 1
2S
, respectively. Rapid fluctuations of demand are transferred to similar
fluctuations of the utility. The A(t1) fluctuates after the history µC = µ(t1)
when the strategies with higher utility indicate identical actions. If A(t1)
strongly fluctuates, then at t1 + 1 about N(1 −
1
2S
) agents have at least
one strategy with high utility and they choose it. Strategies split into two
groups: the first group consisting of high utilities and the second of low
utilities, with a gap between these two groups (cf. Fig. 18). Strategies
with utilities belonging to the same group do not suggest the same actions,
provided µ 6= µC , and therefore no peak of A is generated. The µC has a
non-vanishing probability to reappear at some t2 > t1. All agents belonging
to the group with at least one high-utility strategy tend to react identically
and A(t2) fluctuates maximally, i.e. A(t2) = N(1−
1
2S−1
). This is illustrated
in Fig. 24 (upper left), where for S = 2 we have A(t = 1000) = N
2
. At
t2, all strategies with high U(t2) fail and get the penalty −A(t2), whereas
those with low U(t2) are rewarded with A(t2). After t1 agents are divided
into three groups, provided S = 2: the group with two good strategies, with
one good and one bad, and with two bad. As seen in Fig. 24, at t = 1000
a quarter of the population with two high-utility strategies evolves into two
low-utility groups (lower left), and vice versa for another quarter with two
initially low-utility strategies (lower right). Remaining half of the population
just swaps utilities of their strategies (upper right).
Results showing periodicity of A(t) from simulations become closer to the
theoretical results for large NS/2P ratio. If this ratio is small, then the game
hardly follows the Eulerian path and peaks of A(t) appear randomly.
4.3.7. Stability of the game and behavior of the predictability H
The behavior of HA is driven by absolute disproportions between frac-
tions’ sizes. The payoff is an explicit function of A and, in order to stabilize
the game, the negative and positive payoffs following the same µ have to
compensate mutually. Hence, for any µ: 〈A−|µ〉 = 〈A+|µ〉 and 〈HA〉 = 0.
For this kind of payoff the same frequency of the negative and positive payoffs
do not have to be preserved as it is required for sgn(x) (see Fig. 22, bottom
left).
The last point to understand is the plot ofHa/N that seems to be equal to
zero in the herd regime. TheHa is the sum of 〈a
∗|µ〉 over P different µ’s. Each
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of these components is most likely nonzero and is bounded: 〈a∗|µ〉 ∈ [−1, 1].
Thus max(Ha) = const = P and in the limit N →∞ one has Ha/N = 0.
4.4. The effect of imbalance between fractions
One can try to measure how the size of disproportion between fractions
affects transition probabilities in the Markov chain. To this end we incor-
porate a measure of the distance between two arbitrary processes. Denoting
the set of reference processes by R and the set of examined ones by E , this
measure is defined as
Υ =
∑
i∈E
⋃
R
∑
j∈E
⋃
R
∣∣PrE(xi)PrE(xj |xi)− PrR(xi)PrR(xj |xi)∣∣. (55)
where PrR and PrE stand for the probabilities for the reference and examined
system. The Υ ∈ [0, 2] is suitable to compare any MPs, comprising even such
where processes are based on different sets of states. If Υ = 0, then there
are no differences between processes. If Υ = 2, then processes are based
on strongly disjunctive sets of states. The standard deviation σ(F ) is a
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Figure 25: Distance Υ as a function of σ(F ) for two different payoffs g(x) = sgn(x) (left)
and g(x) = x (right).
measure of disproportion of fractions. The Upsilon as a function of σ(F )
is presented in Fig. 25. The left panel presents Υ measured between the
reference MP (left-hand diagram in Fig. 13) and 40 games where strategies
are drawn from various distributions, provided g(x) = sgn(x). In the case
g(x) = x, the function is more complicated because we do not have just
one MP representing the reference system but for m = 1 there are two
equiprobable attractors, corresponding to two MPs. Therefore we use the
sum of Υ1 + Υ2 as a function of imbalance between fractions, as presented
in Fig. 25 (right). If the game follows attractor 1 then Υ1 = 0 and Υ2 = 2.
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5. Conclusions
In this paper we proposed a consistent, reductionist scheme explaining
phenomenology of minority games in the efficient regime. In this mode the
size of strategy space is much smaller than the number of strategies used by
agents and the population as a whole can access complete information about
the game.
Our discussion begun with the phenomenology. We considered a number
of macroscopic random variables, or their moments, characterizing the game
and being particularly important for applications, such as the aggregated de-
mand, demand’s variance per capita and decision’s or demand’s predictabil-
ities. We studied these variables as functions of the control parameters, e.g.
the ratio of the total number of agents to the number of all possible win-
ning histories, as well as their time evolution. Among interesting features we
found that predictabilities may, or may not, be sensitive to the form of the
payoff function, depending on how the predictabilities are actually defined:
using winning decisions only or the overall demand.
Deeper insight into the mechanism of these behaviors was possible by per-
forming coarse-graining and aggregation of some internal degrees of freedom
of the game, thus defining an intermediate level of description, called meso-
scopic. At such mesoscopic level, fractions of agents using same strategies
are treated as separate entities. Using this method, in the efficient regime
when NS ≫ 2P , we also managed to represent the game as a Markov process
with the finite number of states.
In case where the Markov representation is known, two methodologies
were proposed to explain our observations. First, in the simplified case, the
quenched disorder was neglected, i.e. fractions were assumed to be equal size.
In this case, however, not all observations are properly explained. Behavior
of predictability required extended methodology where the quenched disorder
was used. Two payoffs, the steplike and linear, were separately analyzed. We
showed that in case of the steplike payoff, the stochastic and deterministic
transitions were possible, whereas for the linear payoff, all transitions were
deterministic.
We argued that the Markov process representation of the game completely
defines and explains the dynamics of the game in the stationary regime, and
allows for the calculation of state occupancies. If the transition probabilities
in the Markov chain are known, the phenomenology also becomes under-
standable. For example, the Markov representation provides an explanation
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of the periodicity and preferred levels of the aggregate demand A(t). In
practical terms, this approach is tough for m > 1 due to the large number
of states but the whole reasoning remains valid in general. We failed to find
any relation between the memory length m and the total number of states.
Neither the simplified concept of state nor the Markov process descrip-
tion seem to be correct if the initial preference was given to any strategy.
The definition of the stability was introduced in Sec. 4.1.3, in order to bet-
ter understand asymmetries observed for aggregated variables. The stability
mechanism appeared to be sensitive to the payoff function. In case the step-
like payoff was considered, then the frequency of opposite signs of A after
any µ had to be preserved. In case of the linear payoff, the negative and
positive values of A had to compensate mutually. As a result, depending on
the payoff, both the Ha and HA were equal to zero in the herd regime.
Differences between systems with equal-size fractions and those with
unequal-size fractions were more likely for larger numbers of agents. This
was particularly reflected in distortions of: (i) the transition probabilities, in
case of the steplike payoff, and (ii) attractors, in case of the linear payoff.
In order to quantify this distortion, the measure of distance between two
Markov processes was introduced.
We studied games with the full, maximal strategy space. Some authors,
e.g. in Refs. [2, 26], reduced the strategy space and reproduced many fea-
tures of the full MG, e.g. behavior of variance per capita. The drawback of
their method is that it reduces the number of states in the Markov-chain de-
scription of the game and significantly affects its time evolution. The Markov
representation is oversimplified by such reduction.
Some observables for the proportional payoff were explained without using
the Markov process. For example, there was an observation of distinct peaks
of the aggregated demand, exhibiting height equal to a half of the population,
assuming S = 2. We showed that in the herd regime, there always exists a
history µC for which the fraction 1 −
1
2S
of agents reacts identically and
this is seen in the peak A(t) = N(1 − 1
2S−1
). Apart from using the Markov
chain technique, we found another, simpler one, where only two classes of
strategies were used instead of all 2P classes. This technique is not limited
to the case NS ≫ 2P but works in the whole herd regime. This approach
was also successfully exploited in our analysis of the multi-market minority
game [27].
Considering further research, it could be a significant achievement if a
single, closed-form equation were found for the entire parameter region of
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the MG. So far, in literature, such equations have indeed been found in the
crowded and random regions separately. But a unified description of the
entire range of parameters is still lacking.
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